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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES IN HONG KONG:
INSTITUTIONALIZING ITS EFFECTIVE USE
By
David Huehnergarth*
I.

INTRODUCTION
Dr. Ida Kwan Lun Mak1 wrote Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in
Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its Effective Use2 to analyze the institutional status of alternative
dispute resolution (“ADR”) methods within Hong Kong economic, social and legal systems, and
to suggest mechanisms to advance the institutionalization process.3 Hong Kong is a blossoming
global financial hub, and its laws governing ADR are written specifically to foster more
international business.4 However, the largest strata of Hong Kong’s economy is still comprised of
small private limited companies, whose shareholder disputes are not well suited for resolution via
litigation or dominant arbitral regimes.5 Dr. Mak’s goal in writing this book is to assert a theoretical
framework by which to measure the efficacy of Hong Kong’s current legislation governing
shareholder dispute resolution via legal and private means.6 The author guides the reader through
her research by truncating the book into three sections: the developmental history of ADR in Hong
Kong shareholder disputes, the institutional acceptance and legitimacy of ADR, and her suggested
future legislative adaptations to regulations governing ADR in shareholder disputes. 7 Dr. Mak
concludes that ADR systems employed in Hong Kong shareholder disputes are almost fully
institutionalized, before proposing policy options to expedite the process and improve the standing
of ADR as a potential solution to shareholder disputes.8

* David Huehnergarth is the Books and Literature Editor of the Arbitration Law Review and a 2020 Juris Doctor
Candidate at The Pennsylvania State University School of Law.
1

Dr. Ida Kwan Lun Mak is employed at the University of Hong Kong Department of Law as research assistant. Her
research is specialized in empirical studies of the company laws, alternative dispute resolution methods, and
sociolegal studies employed in Hong Kong. This book is an adaptation of her doctoral thesis, of which the
underlying research was supervised by Katherine Lynch. (IDA KWAN LUN MAK, Alternative Dispute Resolution of
Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its Effective Use xi-xiii (2017)).
2

DR. IDA KWAN LUN MAK, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES IN HONG KONG:
INSTITUTIONALIZING ITS EFFECTIVE USE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (2017).
3

Id. at 16.

4

Id. at 3, 32.

5

Id. at 3-10.

6

Id. at 18.

7

Mak, supra note 2, at vii-viii.

8

Id. at 220-232.
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Dr. Mak uses this book to analyze the progression of institutionalization and to present
findings into what is preventing further progression,9 yet she does not properly consider the most
fundamental element of all types of adjudication; parties and lawyers are self-interested, seeking
outcomes that are as favorable to them as possible.10 For example, Dr. Mak explains that parties
in Hong Kong shareholder disputes are often personally affiliated, and are primarily motivated by
personal desires for money and power.11 Dr. Mak then fails to recognize such motivations as
potential reasons for clients to refuse to employ ADR on judicial or professional advice.12
Similarly, Dr. Mak states that Hong Kong lawyers have monopolized their profession to preserve
the level of their social status and financial compensation,13 then fails to consider the obvious when
questioning why those same lawyers are less likely to utilize or encourage less expensive, more
expedient ADR systems to resolve their client’s shareholder disputes.14 Despite such flaws,
Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong: Institutionalizing Its
Effective Use is still a thorough study that offers compelling legislative options to advance ADR.
Though the ideas presented are incredibly complicated, that depth offers substantial weight to Dr.
Mak’s array of programs and reforms tailored to advance the institutional progress of ADR in
Hong Kong shareholder disputes. Overall, the book is an insightful and informative foray into
Hong Kong shareholder dispute resolution, but the flaws in both its constructive and argumentative
structure chip away at any persuasive weight it may hold.
II.

OVERVIEW

Expressed through eight chapters spanning three main sections,15 this book’s overarching
argument is that ADR is more institutionalized in Hong Kong due to its growing usage by parties
and lawyers and also because of mandates made by the Hong Kong legislature and judiciary to
encourage parties to solve their disputes through ADR.16 The Hong Kong legal system enshrines
an imbalance of power between the city’s historically powerful industrial lobbies and the general
public interest.17 This imbalance is highlighted by a constitutional right to the freedom to contract

9

Mak, supra note 2, at 216.

10

Id. at 132, 158.

11

Id. at 132.

12

Id. at 137, 145.

13

Id. at 158.

14

Mak, supra note 2, at 169.

15

Id. at 28.

16

Id. at 226.

See, e.g., id. at 125 (“[b]ig business enterprises and professional groups in Hong Kong have exerted their political
influences in formulating and implementing the corporate law for safeguarding the free operation of business.”)
17
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and the public’s guaranteed access to courts18; even though people are guaranteed a chance to
plead their case, the fundamental purpose of the Hong Kong legal system is to maximize and
maintain economic growth.19 The recent surge in the use of ADR in shareholder disputes is
paralleled by a dearth of legislation and judicial guidance governing ADR, subsequently pressuring
the government to introduce new policies that promote ADR while maintaining the balance
between business and civilian interests.20 Dr. Mak discusses the facets of this legislative gap in the
three sections of this book.
First, Dr. Mak addresses how dispute resolution methods in Hong Kong dramatically
shifted as the city ascended into a global financial hub; as Hong Kong bloomed, so too did the
number of suits filed in its courts, leading to extensive docket backlogs and a coequal pressure to
clear them.21 One such means is the legislative endorsement of ADR, and chapter three identifies
and develops methodologies to study the current ADR policy, and its reception in the Hong Kong
legal community.22 Comprising chapters four, five and six, part II explains the socio-legal and
empirical analysis of how ADR processes can further consolidate institutional legitimacy in the
law, court rules, and directives, and in the eyes of the Hong Kong legal community.23 Part III is a
singular, forward-looking chapter, which probes the potential for new law governing company
composition and shareholder actions by analyzing similar international schemes for whatever
teachings they can provide on the proper implementation of a court-based ADR system.24 Finally,
Dr. Mak uses a conclusory chapter to summarize her findings from each part and emphasizes the
need for more mechanisms to study Hong Kong dispute resolution only grows as the system
changes.25 If ADR is ever to achieve full institutionalization, the Hong Kong government and
judiciary need clear and objective guidelines, not endless empirical studies, before they can adopt
ADR into comprehensive legislation.26

18

Xianggang Jiben Fa art. 35, § 1, art. 109 §1, art. 110 (H.K.).

19

Mak, supra note 2, at 32 (Dr. Mak cites Articles 35, 109, and 110 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which state,
respectively, that the right to a court date is unfettered, that the Hong Kong government shall act to maintain the
city’s status as an international financial center, and that the law must safeguard the free operation of business.
Xianggang Jiben Fa art. 35, § 1, art. 109 §1, art. 110 (H.K.)).
20

Id. at 72-73.

21

Id. at 32, 217. (the author ties the origin of the shift towards ADR to the construction industry, specifically the
Hong Kong Airport Core Programme, which successfully showed the benefits of mediation and other ADR
methods).
22

Id. at 45-67.

23

Id. at 32.

24

Mak, supra note 2 at 181-215.

25

Id. at 216-31.

Id. at 230 (Dr. Mak cites her definition of meta-analysis to Jeremy A. Blumenthal, ‘Meta Analysis: A Primer for
Legal Scholars,’ TEMPLE LAW REVIEW, 80 (2007), 201-244 at 202).
26
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While the three-pronged organizational structure of the book is clear, the topical
presentation and interrelations between each chapter seem frenetic and unclear. Mak introduces
new concepts without explanation, including arcane sociolegal academic theories, and others are
asserted as fact without any establishing citations.27 The reader is frequently left to thumb between
pages to ascertain what the author is referring to when Mak may or may not have addressed the
topic. Chapter one closes with a list of limitations on the present study, including the lack of
substantive case law analysis on the development of Hong Kong law, yet the author constantly
refers to case law for guidance.28 A study into a developing legal issue would undoubtedly benefit
from a substantive case law analysis, especially when the role of the court is so important to the
topic, that the book dedicates all of chapter four to discussing it. While a consistent and clear
organizational structure could readily fix these problems, the reader will always be disappointed
and confused by the lack depth afforded to the clear and obvious issues surrounding the allocation
of power between parties, and the self-interested motivations that can arise when business partners
oppose each other in court.
III.

INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER

Chapter one introduces the book and provides the foundational factual background behind
unfair prejudice proceedings in Hong Kong shareholder disputes, an explanation of what
institutionalization is, and a summarized catalog of the book’s remaining content.29
Dr. Mak first provides the background on Hong Kong shareholder disputes and the
derivative concerns associated with allowing their resolution by extrajudicial procedures. Hong
Kong is a global financial hub governed by fundamental free-market principles designed to
encourage capitalism and economic growth,30 but sixty percent of the population is employed by
small family businesses, not the giant corporations that dominate the economy.31 These small
businesses are often structured by informal agreements created at the formation of the owner’s
partnership.32 However, because Hong Kong law dictates that all businesses are governed

27

See, e.g., Mak, supra note 2, at 92 (suggesting a winding-up order would be an ineffective and unreasonable
remedy if the parties could find another solution, an order last mentioned without explanation on page six); see also,
id. at 104 (citing the equitable considerations at stake in unfair prejudice proceedings to Ebrahimi v. Westbourne
Galleries, Ltd. [1973] AC 360 at 379, a case last mentioned once on page seven).
28

See, e.g., id. at 157 (discussing historical Hong Kong judicial animus for mediation agreements, as consistent with
Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] HKLRD 723 at 734-735); see also, MAK,
supra note 2, at 57 (“the study of relevant case law . . . should not be ignored, as [cases] can serve as a benchmark
for comparison with the existing case law developments. . .”).
29

Id. at 1-32.

30

See, id. at 38, 76. (Article 110 of the Hong Kong Basic Law provides that the Hong Kong government must
safeguard the free operation of financial business and financial markets. Additionally, Article 109 requires the
government to act to ensure that Hong Kong remains an international financial center).
31

Id. at 3.

32

Mak, supra note 2, at 3.
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exclusively by the majority shareholder, a combination that lends towards disputes when personal
tensions flare.33 When the majority shareholder of a company takes an action which unfairly
prejudices and harms the minority’s interest, the minority can file an unfair prejudice proceeding
with the court seeking a remedy.34 The endless variety of familial and business disagreements
shape derivative shareholder disputes, and therefore whether the majority’s action is sufficient to
justify a legal remedy requires an objective reasonability analysis, judged against established
equitable principles.35 Thus Hong Kong courts are effective forums for unfair prejudice
proceedings because the law provides them with the requisite discretionary flexibility to properly
address the specific needs of each case.36 However, as mentioned previously, the rapid economic
growth of Hong Kong inundated the courts with costly, lengthy, unfair prejudice proceedings, thus,
fostering an ADR industry in the court’s stead, designed to be completely adaptable, less time
consuming, and expensive than judicial alternatives.37 Starting with the Civil Justice Reform of
2009, the Hong Kong government has sought to make ADR the primary method to resolve
shareholder disputes.38
Despite legal incentives, ADR institutionalization in Hong Kong is not yet complete.
Institutionalization is a “process by which certain practices . . . have acquired legitimacy through
their link to broader cultural framework of beliefs or norms that most people support and will
therefore endorse[,]” and the institutionalization status of a practice is defined as being pre, semi,
or fully institutionalized.39 Mak identifies three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and culturalcognitive.40 To properly analyze the institutional progress of ADR, Dr. Mak next explains its risks
and the legitimacy it has and has not yet acquired under Hong Kong law. She assesses a semiinstitutional status to ADR in Hong Kong shareholder disputes because the public and legal
professionals retain doubts about its fairness and efficacy.41
33

Mak, supra note 2, at 3; see also id. at 108 n. 21 (stating majority shareholders sometimes opt to align business
interests with their personal interests, in defiance of the firm’s best interest. William R. Scott, Financial Accounting
Theory, 3rd ed. (Toronto Practice Hall, 2003), 273-279).
34

Id. at 4-8.

35

Id. at 5, 12-13 (Dr. Mak identifies three objective classifications of disputes: dissension, oppression, and
deadlock).
36

Id. at 6 (the author states this is because unfair prejudice proceedings are derived from a law designed to protect
minority shareholders, because the 2014 Companies Ordinance Cap. 622 expanded a courts discretion in granting
relief, and because unfair prejudice proceedings are cheaper and more flexible than other statutory alternatives).
37

Id. at 6-29. (the author identifies seven basic dispute resolution methods: negotiations, facilitative mediation,
collaboration, mini-trials, expert determination, arbitration, and court adjudication).
38

Practice Direction 3.3, paras 8-11 (Hong Kong courts now compel or recommend the parties undertake some form
of ADR before the court proceeding can continue towards a court verdict).
39

Mak, supra note 2, at 16.

40

Id. at 17.

Id. at 17, 19, 79 (the Basic Law of Hong Kong “originate[s] from the free-market ideology, which is in accord
with shared beliefs among the powerful group of elite businessmen . . . [,]” and, under the right to a court hearing,
41
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Finally, the chapter ends by outlining a theoretical framework to measure the
institutionalization of ADR in Hong Kong shareholder disputes by the progression of its societal
legitimacy.42 Indicative of similar issues to come, the organizational structure of the introduction
is inconsistent within itself and the rest of the book, possibly confusing the reader. 43 There is a
lack of any proper foray into the problem of self-interested parties and lawyers, even though
chapter one provides the basis of this criticism as a fundamental concern affecting the topic.44
Though the introduction establishes all the of the foundational background built on later, the
inconsistent amount of explanation proffered for later chapters could confuse the reader.45 If the
introduction were retooled to reflect the remainder of the book better, it would properly build on
itself to introduce the remaining topics rather than providing some sort of crash course in Hong
Kong litigation and sociological theory. Lastly, despite being a necessary inclusion, the string of
self-imposed limitations on the present study seem both excessively harsh and arbitrary and may
cause the reader to question the merits of the remainder of the book.46
IV.

DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF ADR
OVERVIEW

FOR

SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES

IN

HONG KONG AN

To properly introduce the factual context of the following theoretical and empirical
analysis, chapter two restates the origin of the use of ADR in Hong Kong and how it came to
become the industry standard for shareholder disputes.47 The primary point established in chapter
two is that ADR and court-based shareholder proceedings are complementary and compatible with
each other, though the author concludes the court’s future is to promote the benefits of ADR to
skeptical legal professionals, while ADR will become the primary dispute resolution method.48

treats ADR as a completely voluntary process, for which agreement is determined solely by the decision of the
majority shareholder. The non-binding nature of ADR means the practice is relegated to an extra step in litigation).
42

Mak, supra note 2, at 16-32.

43

Id. at 18, 28 (within the chapter, the three organizational themes are listed to imply there is nothing after the
chapter six analysis of legal professional’s opinions on ADR. The introduction also refers to itself in a manner that
implies there is another introductory chapter, and that the current chapter is not chapter one).
44

Id. at 16 n. 69.

45

See, e.g., id. at 17-25 (the author includes the definition of each type of institutionalization but reserves the
coequally important definitions for the types of legitimacy to be established in two later chapters. Similarly, the
author reserves explaining how institutionalization could improve for the final chapter, before proceeding to frame
how the book will argue the point six chapters before the topic is discussed).
46

Id. at 29 (the author opted only to survey lawyers for their opinions on ADR, despite rehashing, in this chapter and
most others, the role judicial discretion plays in both remedying unfair prejudice in shareholder disputes, as well as
when to stay proceedings to recommend parties proceed to ADR).
47

Mak, supra note 2 at 30.

48

Id. at 31.
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Dr. Mak first explains the deeper history of ADR in Hong Kong, tying the commonality of
the practice to the specific litigative needs of an international financial hub; international
companies prefer ADR for its flexibility and confidentiality.49 Since arbitration is a preferred
resolution medium for international commercial disputes, to remain an international financial hub,
Hong Kong must remain the international arbitral hub of Asia to comply with Article 109 of the
Basic Law.50 In time, courts realized that recommending parties to an unfair prejudice proceeding
to first use ADR before seeking court adjudication was actually a proper use of a judge’s discretion
to manage cases because a court-affiliated ADR system was not a lesser procedure but a
supplementary practice that could improve the court system.51 In dereliction of the precedential
disdain for the process, and in the wake of the success of arbitration, as a means to mitigate the
costs and duration of court-based shareholder proceedings, Hong Kong law began to encourage
ADR to resolve shareholder disputes.52
Chapter two does not provide much new information for the reader and serves to represent
the organizational flaws common throughout the book. To the reader, this chapter seems needlessly
redundant, offering no argumentative insight into the topic and only introduces the details of the
Hong Kong arbitral industry already discussed in chapter one.53 However, that information on
arbitration is almost irrelevant to the remainder of the book, as “[m]ediation is now recognized as
the primary ADR process used for the reform of the law and procedures relating to unfair prejudice
proceedings.”54 The reader would likely not be confused if chapter one had already incorporated
this chapter, nor would the reader be troubled should this chapter have been expanded to address
other elements important to the topic but fall beyond the scope of the book, like other ADR
processes or notable landmark cases.
V.

KEY METHODS
DISPUTES

FOR

EVALUATION

OF

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

ON

ADR

IN

SHAREHOLDER

To analyze the legitimacy level achieved by ADR in shareholder disputes, Dr. Mak needed
to create her own research methodology to properly quantify any objective factors weighed in the
decision to promote or discourage ADR from a subjective survey of Hong Kong legal
49

See e.g. Mak, supra note 2, at 31.

50

Id. at 34-36 (the Hong Kong arbitration industry was promoted by modernizing its law to meet international
standards, by funding its own arbitral institution, and by innovating new practices and freedoms for parties to
employ).
51

Id. at 38-44 (the right to access court under Basic Law Article 35 meant courts could order parties to undergo
ADR, absent their mutual agreement not to, if either party could still petition for the hearing to resume upon
completion of the ADR method).
52

Id. at 39.

53

Id. at 8-15.

Mak, supra note 2 at 15 (citing Rimsky Yuen, ‘HK a Perfect Partner in Mediation’, Conference on Asia Pacific
International Mediation Summit (India, 15, February 2015).
54
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professionals, and she uses chapter three to explain it.55 Dr. Mak explains that a realistic evaluation
method is optimal because it incorporates the context, mechanisms, and potential outcomes of a
dispute and allows the use of preexisting theories and knowledge in conjunction with data when
constructing a methodology.56 To assess the context in which ADR has acquired legitimacy
requires reviewing the differences between the current era of shareholder disputes which have
legitimized ADR, and the established culture of unfair prejudice settlements that had preceded the
2009 reforms; Dr. Mak identified reformed company law, the court’s encouragement of ADR, and
reformed court rules as contextual factors to study.57 Dr. Mak next specifies three mechanisms that
improve the understanding and awareness of ADR in shareholder disputes: coercive, normative,
and mimetic mechanisms that could have institutionalized the use of ADR in shareholder
disputes.58 Lastly, legitimization corresponds to their respective stage of institutionalization:
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive.59
Dr. Mak also assesses the merits of a pluralist methodology, whereby multiple methods are
mixed to achieve a broader understanding of the legal and non-legal factors driving
institutionalization.60 Lastly, traditional legal study methods, comparative study methods, and
empirical legal research comprise the author’s preferred research method.61 The traditional method
involves a case law review and understands the law as a set of social beliefs and practices,
including those of judges, and thus cases should include some of the social beliefs which drove
the decision.62 Comparative study here meant comparing foreign ADR practices with those of
Hong Kong, and the findings suggest that incorporating and imitating foreign practices is highly
effective at driving legitimacy.63 Lastly, the empirical method was used to identify the underlying

55

Mak, supra note 2, at 45-67.

Id. at 45-48 (Dr. Mak cites the “context, mechanisms, outcome” pattern to Pawson and Tilley, ‘Realistic
Evaluation,’ 83-88. She chose this method because it best accommodates small data sets comprised of anecdotal
evidence of variable subjects).
56

57

Id. at 51-53.

58

Id. (coercive mechanisms are rules established by a controlling authority, and which must be followed at risk of
punishment. Normative mechanisms stem from beliefs, habits, and values which are taken for granted, like using
something different because you believe it to be the new norm. Mimetic mechanisms originate in the need to cope
with uncertainty by copying established legitimate models).
59

Id. at 54-55 (pragmatic legitimacy arises from a self-interested calculation to determine the best direction. Moral
legitimacy arises when authority figures provide a moral blessing to an action. Cultural-cognitive legitimacy is
achieved when a norm is considered as indispensable, and abidance carries similar status to a rule or law).
60

Mak, supra note 2 at 58.

61

Id. at 56.

62

Id. at 57-59.

63

Id. at 60.
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factors affecting lawyer’s positions on ADR and helps to understand the motivations and actual
opinions expressed by legal practitioners.64
Given the niche size of the research topic, Dr. Mak was forced to tailor the appropriate
sample to only 120 subjects, with three nonresponses, a risk which she defends by stating she
sufficiently controlled her population to produce a representative sample despite the small size,
though it does not preclude other factors from driving the findings.65 However, she does admit the
potential for her data collection method, a five answer multiple-choice survey used to measure
subjective opinions, to produce inaccurate results based on disparities in each subject.66
Having fully outlined the methodology for her empirical review of lawyerly opinions on
ADR, the author resigns the section three full chapters from its implementation,67 another example
of the disorganization that a reader could readily find confusing. The author also put the overall
conclusion of the chapter, her usage of a pluralist research methodology, in the middle of the
chapter, after speaking about the context, mechanisms, outcome model as if it was going to be
employed.68 Given the nuance and esoteric nature associated with the field research methodologies
of socio-legal theory, the lack of initial direction from the author means the reader could easily be
confused about which method the author was choosing. Further, that detail and understanding will
be three chapters stale when the reader reaches its implementation, further risking confusion.
Among concerns with the methodology itself, the author’s limitation, the preclusion of any
case law analysis seems indefensible after the author also stated that analyzing case law before the
passage of the ADR legislation was necessary to ascertain the socio-legal factors that motivated
judicial decision making.69 The author admits the risks associated with the method and presents
the statistical analysis undertaken as a defense against accusations of bias.70 However, the author
never explains what those statistical mechanisms do, or how they adapt the findings around bias,
a manner any reader without an advanced understanding of predictive statistics could understand.
The chapter should be closer to the actual study results, and it needs to organize and explain the
specific numerical methods to be employed.
VI.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT: SECURING THE LEGITIMACY
INITIATIVES FOR SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES

OF

COURT-CONNECTED ADR

64

Mak, supra note 2 at 62.

65

Id. at 63-65, 177.

66

Id. at 177.

67

Id. at 66 n. 101, n. 102, n. 103, n. 104 (all of these footnotes say to see chapter 6 for the discussion of the study).

68

Id. at 51-60.

69

Mak, supra note 2 at 60.

See, e.g., id. at 166 (“[i]n further attempt [sic] to assess model fit, the author computed the Hosmer-Lemeshow
goodness-of-fit test statistics. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test put observations into groups based on
estimated probabilities then computes a Pearson Chi-square statistic based on the observed and estimated
frequencies in the groups, and thus a lack of model fit.”)
70
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Chapter four opens by assigning the courts the role of mitigating the dangers of self-interest
in an adversarial system; the length and cost of shareholder disputes is the product of
“unscrupulous litigants or lawyers” abusing the court rules to delay proceedings and starve the
opponent’s resources.71 However, merely changing courtroom procedural rules is unlikely to affect
change, and thus the author uses chapter four to analyze how a combination of ADR and the
bench’s power to manage its cases can improve the cost and quality concerns associated with all
shareholder disputes.72 The cooperative role between the two resolution practices is derived from
the court’s power to encourage litigants to partake in ADR under its own oversight, affecting the
ADR method with its own cultural-cognitive legitimacy under the rules and economic values under
Hong Kong Basic Law.73
For cost and quality to improve in a court-connected ADR proceeding, the parties cannot
act unscrupulously, both by using mediation as a litigative ploy and for personal gain, and this is
not a guarantee.74 The first argument is subject to a glaring required assumption, one that is
validated by the author both earlier and later in the book, and one that could cause a reader to
question the credibility of the proposal. Some studies have already shown ADR to be just as
lengthy and as expensive as litigation.75 The Basic Law’s guaranteed right to court compounds this
problem, because regardless of the finality of an ADR agreement, either party can still move to
litigation, thus relegating court-connected ADR to another step in the litigation process.76
Next, the author suggests that courts may legitimize connected shareholder ADR
proceedings by emphasizing the commonality between the policy objectives of court-connected
ADR and the economic motivations within the Hong Kong Basic Law.77 By providing a more
cost-effective dispute resolution method that enhances efficiency while increasing corporate
autonomy, the author argues court-connected ADR is aligned with the tenets of the Basic Law and
thus will be granted the cultural-cognitive legitimacy the Basic Law- provides.
Upon analysis of judicial opinion to determine the accuracy of that statement, the book
presents the second most glaring issue with an argument for greater institutionalization of ADR.78
71

Mak, supra note 2, at 71.

72

Id. at 72 (the quality of the ADR is defined as a measure of party autonomy and control over the proceeding).

73

Id. at 73-74 (the author emphasizes this point by explaining that a court which applies to an ADR case, a system
of rules that lacks the force of laws, the local community will subsequently treat those rules with a higher degree of
legitimacy).
74

See, e.g., id. at 16 (majority shareholders will sometimes attend ADR sessions with no intention to work towards
an amicable settlement because the law favors them in court, and there is no prescribed minimum level of
participation necessary for ADR).
75

Id. at 169 (citing Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW, 74 (2005),
329-404 at 396-397).
76

See, e.g., Mak, supra note 2, at 139.

77

Id. at 81.

78

Id. at 82.
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Court-ordered ADR fails to properly resolve disputes because it punishes parties for exercising
their right to seek a trial under the Basic Law.79 In an effort to expedite ADR proceedings and to
ensure the parties take them seriously, Hong Kong courts are entitled to assess costs on parties
who refuse to go to ADR.80 Given parties in Hong Kong shareholder disputes tend to be poorer,
so much so they generally need financial aid to afford any shareholder dispute proceedings,81 the
threat of cost sanctions could be considered coercion, so much so that lawyers have taken to simply
advising their clients to go to ADR in bad faith rather than absorb the sanction.82 Even if the party
were to return to court after ADR, making ADR a step in the litigation game, the process still takes
time and money, opposite the intended purpose of the law. This flaw supports the argument that
self-interested motivations and an imbalanced remedy structure mars the Hong Kong shareholder
ADR system. The stronger party can more likely absorb the additional legal costs of either
pointless ADR proceedings or cost sanctions, rendering the entire ADR proceeding into a farce
meant to drain the weaker party’s resources. A reader could interpret this as a failure to facilitate
greater access to dispute resolution, a gaping hole in the author’s argument in favor of court-based
ADR. Additionally, the reader could see this as a byproduct of a continuing oversight in the
author’s theory favoring ADR for unfair prejudice proceedings, one that prevents the practice from
ascending the rungs of institutionalization and legitimacy.
The final argument presented in chapter four, that courts better address the proportionality
concerns of minority shareholders, supports the self-interest argument against court-ordered ADR;
the book states that courts will strike down an unfair prejudice petition upon notice that the
respondent has made a reasonable offer to buy out the petitioner.83 Winding-up-order based
remedies84 prevent those unscrupulous litigators from harassing the other party with unfair buyout
offers, while also preventing those similarly devious parties from using court-ordered arbitration
as an evidentiary fishing expedition.85 ADR would have created numerous new opportunities for
the majority party to decimate the weaker party’s resources. The author comes unbelievably close
to admitting this problem is still prevalent by citing to new law which prevents the disclosure of

79

Mak, supra note 2, at 82.

80

Practice Direction 31, paras. 4 and 5 (though there are no enumerated minimum participation levels in Practice
Direction 31, examples are included in Appendix C, footnote 4).
81

Mak, supra note 2, at 83-89.

82

Id. at 89.

83

Id. at 93.

A winding up order refers to a court order mandating shareholders to facilitate the sale of one shareholder’s stock
in a company to the other shareholder(s), where generally the complaining party at court is the selling shareholder. It
is essentially a court ordered selloff meant to ensure that a fair price and deal is offered to a party seeking to leave a
company.
84

85

Mak, supra note 2, at 95.
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mediation communications,86 however this does not address concerns associated with a majority
party pressuring the weaker party into an unfair buyout agreement.
VII.

REFORMS OF COMPANY LAW: LEGITIMIZING THE USE OF INFORMAL PROCESSES
CONJUNCTION WITH COURT BASED SHAREHOLDER PROCEEDINGS

IN

The recently passed Section 727 of the Companies Ordinance enables the Hong Kong Chief
Justice to promulgate rules regulating unfair prejudice proceedings. This chapter is Dr. Mak’s
effort to examine how the new rulemaking structure will coincide with extrajudicial and courtbased unfair prejudice proceedings, specifically how the court may now create rules that require
parties to consider or undergo ADR processes in unfair prejudice proceedings. 87 Again the author
addresses the symptoms of self-interested litigants, and again fails to extrapolate how the issue
could affect mandatory ADR processes, instead asserting, without citation, that it the effect such a
situation will have on minority shareholder rights is uncertain.88 Instead, the author uses chapter
five to assert that the corporate policy conventions under the new rules balance the flexibility of
ADR proceedings with the need to protect minority shareholders from intrinsic procedural
imbalances. The author does this by acknowledging that corporate legal structures which enable
total internal control over shareholder disputes can result in abuse by the majority shareholders,
albeit a rare occurrence.89
The argument states a strong legal framework paired with an efficient court enforcement
system is a prerequisite to protect minority shareholders from controlling shareholders, and that
available, efficient dispute resolution systems are perquisites for an efficient court and economic
system.90 Thus, the author concludes, incorporating ADR further into statutory unfair prejudice
practices will open access to resolution structures, which enables a potent enforcement system,
which thus protects the minority shareholders from controlling majority interests by providing a
wider selection of remedies to a breach of their rights.91
Any reader will notice that the author is precluding the ability of the minority shareholder
to adequately acquire remedies for the breach of their rights by the majority. Rather, the author
asserts that a wider pool of remedial choices constitutes sufficient protections for the minority
interest simply because it offers more party choices, and also because private ADR remedies
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cannot achieve the guaranteed efficiency and fairness associated with a court-ordered winding-up
proceeding as mentioned above.92
Next, the author presents the pitfall in caseloads in American civil courts as evidence that
people consider ADR as an adjudicative process that is compatible with the goals and purposes of
the courts, and again fails to present an explanation for how the imbalance of power between
majority and minority shareholders can derogate the rights of the minority.93 Dr. Mak attempts to
show a lack of coercion present when arbitration proceedings are forced by law or by court order
by stating that civilians must uphold their legal commitments or else risk damaging the legitimacy
of them.94 Any reader would note that this argument fails even to assert a lack of coercion; that a
person is obligated to honor their legal commitments when they involve tolerating a loss of a
fundamental right just because the rulemaking body depends on acquiescence to survive, cannot
be considered an exercise of choice. This argumentative weakness is highlighted by the author’s
later references to the uncertainty of the future as a justification against enforcement of consensual
mediation agreements.95 The conclusion to chapter five, that ADR and court proceedings are
compatible and complementary programs that also offer intrinsic benefits in unfair prejudice
disputes, is so predicated on logical fallacies that it has the potential to destroy any credibility the
reader still holds for the author’s arguments. Properly addressing the vulnerability to majority
abuse in Hong Kong’s shareholder ADR system would have properly fixed chapter five.
VIII.

DIFFUSION OF PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HONG KONG
LAWYER’S ATTITUDES ABOUT THE USE OF ADR FOR SHAREHOLDER DISPUTES

Chapter six is the empirical analysis meant to reinforce the author’s numerous hypothesis
and preexisting arguments about the status of institutionalization of ADR as applied in shareholder
disputes.96 Dr. Mak suggests that ADR needs the acceptance of legal professionals and their
professional organizations to achieve full institutionalization because the status requires changing
the fundamental “dichotomous win-lose” nature of the adversarial courtroom so that lawyers can
help their clients pursue consensual settlement solutions through ADR.97 Immediately, a diligent
reader could notice the author has again overlooked self-interested motivations for this type of
lawyering, instead arguing the culture of the trial structure needs to be changed to accommodate
ADR.98 Moreover, the author assumes that lawyers do not want the current type of court
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proceedings to continue over the alternative dispute resolution options, even though the author’s
position requires admitting that lawyers would risk sacrificing their financial and social status to
change the system.99 In response, the author suggests that lawyers would take this risk because it
presents an opportunity to raise their own social status by being one of the few who provide lowcost ADR representation.100
Next Dr. Mak explains how she extracted the factors which dictate lawyer’s opinions on
ADR, generating six factors: compatibility, advantages, barriers, familiarity, network association
and legal culture.101 Using the method outlined in chapter three, Dr. Mak consolidated the answers
from her survey into broader categories, then performed a series of statistic calculations to yield
factor loading coefficient values, which indicate the best combination of factors explain any
variance from her hypothesized answers.102
Addressing the findings on each factor, Dr. Mak first addresses compatibility, or a
perceived degree of compatibility between court-based unfair prejudice proceedings and ADR,
and found the factor produced a positive correlation supporting ADR adoption by survey
respondents.103
Next, Dr. Mak highlights her findings of an inverse correlation between a Hong Kong
lawyer’s awareness of the advantages ADR offers over formal court-based remedies and methods
and the likelihood that Hong Kong lawyer will recommend or employ ADR in his career.104 Dr.
Mak suggested the deep-rooted cultural implications of winner-take-all lawyering derives this
correlation,105 however, this could also be explained by lawyer’s self-interested desire not to
sacrifice a more lucrative line of work in exchange for a change of structure. There is a possibility
that lawyers who are aware of the benefits of ADR are also aware of the risk of sham mediation
as permitted under the current legal hierarchy. Lawyers, either adversarial or ameliorative, seek to
achieve a beneficial outcome for their client, and entering into mediation when it carries the risk
of being a waste of the client’s time and money may explain such hostility to the practice.
Barriers, or inhibitions associated with ADR that are not associated with court-based
shareholder proceedings, generated an unexpectedly positive correlation, suggesting the presence
of issues like enforceability of the mediation agreement, and the risk parties will use the ADR
hearings to trawl for discovery or delay proceedings, causes lawyers to recommend ADR.106 The
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author suggests the court’s case-by-case case management powers may offer a more consistent
means to enforce mediated agreements.107
Lawyers familiar with the ADR process are more likely to employ ADR to help their
clients, with a significant margin of support associated with the mitigated inequality imposed on
the smaller party when their attorney was familiar with ADR processes.108
Professional network affiliation with ADR presented inconclusive evidence towards or
against individual practitioners utilizing ADR, and the author could not conclusively determine
whether Hong Kong lawyers were capable or incapable of acting in accordance with the friendlier
notions of ADR proceedings.109
Lastly, a legal certainty that minority shareholders will receive judicial relief does not
affect legal professional’s opinions of ADR and if they would be more or less likely to employ it
as a result.110
IX.

INNOVATIVE APPROACHES TO THE FUTURE CODIFICATION OF ADR FOR SHAREHOLDER
DISPUTES IN HONG KONG: BORROWING MODELS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, NEW
ZEALAND, AND SOUTH AFRICA.

The penultimate chapter of the book harkens back to mimetic legitimacy111 to fill the lack
of research into how to use policy to institutionalize ADR in shareholder dispute resolution further.
Dr. Mak does this by analyzing the legal treatment affected on ADR by three other common law
countries, the United Kingdom, Singapore, and South Africa. The analysis creates three policy
suggestions, derived respectively from one per country: 1) a company law rule that permits the
parties to include an arbitration clause in the articles of association of the company, thereby
assuring all shareholder disputes are subject binding arbitration, 2) mandatory ADR provisions
included in the national company law, and 3) issuing a voluntary company law which recommends
companies use ADR to resolve shareholder disputes and requires disclosure of how the company
addressed said disputes.112
The author adapted these findings to accommodate the purely voluntary nature of Hong
Kong ADR proceedings and suggested that future studies could seek out more law, or potentially
original suggestions as well.113 The same was done as it pertains to subject matter inarbitrability,
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which the author determined would be a non-issue as an expression of contract freedom in Hong
Kong.114
X.

CONCLUSION

Dr. Mak wrote Alternative Dispute Resolution of Shareholder Disputes in Hong Kong:
Institutionalizing its Effective Use, to examine and offer potential means to legitimize ADR in
unfair prejudice proceedings.115 The book offers a comprehensive history of the use of ADR in
Hong Kong business, an introduction and explanation for numerous sociological examination
methods and standards, and finally concludes that there is no current consensus surrounding the
use of ADR in shareholder disputes. In offering her theories surrounding the lack of consensus,
Dr. Mak considers and discusses numerous possible explanations, but consistently fails to measure
the possible influence self-interest, both on the part of the lawyer and the client, may have on the
pre-institutionalized status of ADR. Regardless, she still offers numerous and valid mechanisms
to advance the use of ADR, each of which she designs to suit the unique nature of the Hong Kong
economy properly. Her final conclusion is that the judiciary, legislature, and the professional legal
sphere must all work to encourage the use of ADR before the practices gain more legitimacy, and
she invites future studies to better explain the best means to achieve that end.
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